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RESPONSIBILITY OF RADIO STATIONS
FOR EXTEMPORANEOUS
DEFAMATION'
REYNOLDS C. SEITZ
I. NON-CONSENT AS AN ELEMENT IN DETERMINING LIABILITY
A RECENT argument 2 made in behalf of imposing absolute liability
on radio broadcasting companies, in cases where an extempora-
neous defamatory remark (i.e., a departure from a previously sub-
mitted manuscript) is made by an employee of someone who buys time
on the air, focuses attention upon the question as to whether consent of
defendants to publish has been so self-evident in defamation cases as
to cause its importance to be forgotten. The first part of this article is
written on the assumption that the answer must be in the affirmative.
'This article has as its sole objective the discussion of the liability of radio
broadcasting stations under the special circumstances clearly indicated. It is
not the writer's intent to touch upon the liability of concerns which buy time
on the air. Nor is it the purpose of this article to analyze the station's liability
for a defamatory remark which is read from the manuscript or its liability
when it dispenses with previous submission of the script, or when it joins a
chain program and consequently may never see the script. On these three
latter points, Vold's discussion, cited note 2, infra, is logical and clear.
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It is common to find that in various divisions of the law case con-
gestion quite often develops around the area covered by a word or
phrase. For a brief substantiation, recall the significance of "right to
control" in litigation raising the independent contractor question, of
"unlawful act" in controversy bringing up the battery issue, and of
"duty and foreseeability" in legal cause tort conflicts. In the field of
defamation the word "intention" has received a considerable share of
judicial cognizance.3 This clearly has been true in the cases involving
the liability of newspapers for publishing defamatory statements.
It is in that sphere that the courts 4 and authorities5 emphatically
lay down the rule that one who publishes defamatory matter of another
is not relieved from liability because he did not intend the matter so
published to be understood as defamatory. And the rule is adhered to
even when it appears that a defendant neither knew nor by the exercise
of every possible precaution could have known that a published state-
ment would be understood as defamatory. Hence if a newspaper were
to falsely publish in its birth column a statement that B's wife had
given birth to a baby boy, the newspaper would be liable although the
proprietor or employees of the newspaper neither knew nor had reason
to know that B and his wife had been married but one month. Because
of such an attitude, writers6 have been influenced to refer to the law of
defamation as involving in some of its aspects absolute liability or lia-
bility without fault. In coming to such a conclusion, reasoning has not
disregarded logic. For it is clear that newspapers and others did intend
to publish that which appears in print,7 and that as a result some third
person suffered harm to his reputation. Fairness demands that the
disseminator respond in damages for the harm caused. Justice should
not be restricted just because certain extrinsic facts happen to be
known to readers which are not discoverable by publishers even when
they exercise the highest degree of care. Almost universal accord with
2 Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts (1940) 88 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 249.
s Interstate Co. v. Garnett, 154 Miss. 325, 122 So. 373 (1929) ; Nash v. Fisher,
24 Wyo. 535, 162 Pac. 932 (1917); Ladwig v. Heyer, 136 Iowa 196, 113 N.W.
767 (1907); Morrison v. Richey & Co. (1902) 39 Scot. L. Rzv. 432; Wash-
ington Post Co. v. Kennedy, 3 F. (2d) 207, 41 A.L.R. 483 (App. D.C. 1925);
Walker v. Bee-News Publishing Co., 122 Neb. 511, 240 N.W. 579 (1932).
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554, 53 L.Ed. 960 (1909) ; Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364, 34 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1137 (1909).
53 TORTS RESTATEMENT (1938) § 580. See particularly comment (c) on the
matter of newspaper liability; HARPER, TORTS, par. 237 (1935).
6 HARPER, TORTS, par. 237 (1935); Vold, Defnaratory Interpolations in Radio
Broadcasts (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 249.7 It is, of course, obvious that a newspaper company could not defend on the
ground an employee had been negligent. Hence it is accurate to say that the
newspaper company intended to publish what appeared in print.
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such a philosophy is not surprising." Such agreement is induced by the
realization that a defendant consented to the publication. But the ele-
ment of consent is so obvious that the courts neglect to talk about it.
For when a group of words appears in print it is unnecessary to point
out that the publisher consents to their appearance. Judges are only
doing the natural thing when they fail to put emphasis on the evident.
Nor is such a pattern for judicial expression employed solely in the
field of defamation. It is common for the judiciary to place stress upon
concepts which need clarification and to pass over essential but apparent
doctrine.
Nowhere is such an attitude more capable of demonstration than in
tort cases involving negligence. In that area all tribunals recognize the
basic rule that liability results only when a defendant has a duty to
use reasonable care not to harm a specific person or a general class of
persons.9 All are aware, however, that in numerous negligence cases' °
the court does not say a word about duty. That is not because duty is
not essential, but because its presence is so self-evident. But just as
soon as a set of facts comes into being in which duty is not apparent,
the court gives adequate and extensive treatment to a discussion of the
necessity of finding it, and takes a stand upon its presence or absence
in the specific litigation. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R. R. Co." is an excellent illustration of such technique. When
faced with a factual situation giving rise to a doubt as to the existence
of a duty to plaintiff, Cardozo did not hesitate to discuss the whole
duty philosophy.
Basing prediction upon such observable conduct, it would seem that
the courts should accept the responsibility for discussing the importance
of consent when they meet with a radio case involving a defamatory
interpolation. The fact that the consent element was neglected in the
only case 12 involving such a background which has to date come to the
attention of any court is not significant as tending to destroy the sup-
position. This is true, because under Pennsylvania law 3 there could be
no such thing as the doctrine of liability without fault controlling the
decision in a defamation case. Hence there was no need for the court
to discuss or dispose of the consent element before making up its mind
as to whether absolute liability should be imposed.
8 But to understand the possibility of various views, see Smith, Jones v. Hutton:
Three Conflicting Judicial Views as to a Question of Defamation (1912) 60
U. oF PA. L. Rzv. 365, and cases cited in a note (1939) 24 MINN. L. Rzv. 118.9 HARPER, ToRTs, par. 8 and 73 (1935).
2oExamples are so many as not to require citation. But for brief substantiation,
note Wagner v. International R. R. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
There Cardozo wrote the opinion just as he did in the Palsgraf case, infra,
note 11.11248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253 (1928).
12 Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co. (Pa. 1939) 8 A. (2d) 302.
13 Supra, note 12.
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But in those more numerous jurisdictions where the law of defama-
tion can involve absolute liability14 under a factual situation such as
disclosed by the case of Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting
Co., 5 it should be difficult for the court not to face the issue of consent
as related to the matter of absolute liability for an extemporaneous
defamatory utterance. Furthermore, since this type of liability without
fault is not supported by the philosophy emerging from the ultra-
hazardous activity concept, it is submitted that a discussion of the
consent element is inescapable.
The underlying thesis of this part of the article is that there would
be no such thing as absolute liability in connection with the law of
defamation if we could not find a consent to the publishing of a particu-
lar statement. As has already, been pointed out, a newspaper is liable
only because it consented to print an article-that is so even though
it did not intend to defame. Consequently it would seem that the direct
analogy which Professor Vold 16 draws between the liability of a news-
paper for defamation and what should be the liability of a broadcast-
ing station for a harmful extemporaneous remark can be challenged.
And that is so even if we grant the truth of the statement on which
the analogy is based-namely that a newspaper in all instances can-
not protect itself by the use of due care. (Neither can the broadcasting
station in what is truly an analogous situation growing out of the utter-
ance of something in the manuscript which turns out to be defama-
tory.) For it does not follow from such suggested premise, as Pro-
fessor Vold would make it appear, that the broadcaster should be liable
if an advertiser speaks a defamatory interpolation. True it is that the
broadcaster is in no better position to have advance knowledge of the
defamatory character of the statement than is the newspaper publisher.
But he is in a much better position as regards consent to publish. The
newspaper publisher did consent; the broadcaster did not.
To demonstrate the significance of defendant's consent in connec-
tion with the attaching of liability, it will be appropriate to refer to a
field where by statute owners of automobiles are made liable for the
negligence of persons operating a car with the owner's consent.' 7 It is
'1 Supra, note 6. In this connection it should be understood that this type of
absolute liability is not based upon the foundation of an ultrahazardous
activity.
'1 (Pa. 1939) 8 A. (2d) 302.
16 Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts (1940) 88 U. OF PA. L.
Rzv. 276. It is recognized that without specifically mentioning consent by name,
Void finds an implied consent emerging out of the fact that permission was
given to use the station facilities, and the impossibility of preventing an inter-
polation. For reasons to be stated later, the writer cannot agree that there has
been consent of the type described in this article.
"1 For an excellent discussion and analysis of such statutes, see a note at (1937)
21 MINN. L. REv. 823.
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obvious that the intent of such legislation is to impose a qualified form
of absolute liability upon the owners of motor vehicles where none
existed at common law. For the first time owners who had before
been liable only under the principle of respondeat superior"" or the
family purpose doctrine 9 became liable for the negligence of one to
whom an automobile had been entrusted by the owner in situations
where the relation of master and servant, principal and agent, husband
and wife, parent and child2" did not exist. However, liability did not
result in cases where the owner's consent had been exceeded.2'
But a pertinent question demands attention at this place. What might
be asked is the connection between consent in the area of extempora-
neous defamation over the radio and consent to operate an automobile
as the term is used in statutes imposing liability on automobile owners.
The tie-up is not obscure when analyzed. If the thesis of this article
in respect to the necessity of considering consent in the area of defama-
tion covered by this discussion is accepted, it then becomes apparent
that the decisions under the automobile owner's liability statutes can
be used to illustrate the importance of consent as effecting ultimate
results. The automobile cases are particularly valid because they arise
in a division of the law where a form of quasi-absolute liability has
been imposed on car owners. 22 And the radio defamation cases appear,
as has been previously indicated, in an area of the law which in some
of its aspects involves liability without fault. It is, of course, true that
in the automobile situation the consent is made important by statute.
However, it is submitted that the legislature in creating the statute
responded to the influence of natural logic in realizing that a man
should not be held absolutely liable if he does not consent to the use Of-
an instrument which he owns and which makes the harm possible.
Such reasoning leads directly back to the fundamental proposition
touched upon in this article. Factually it is clear that the radio station
did consent that an advertiser or his employee be allowed to use the
broadcast facilities. Still and in spite of argument to the contrary,
23
it seems certain that the radio station only permitted use in accordance
with its consent. And, as is evident, the consent was only to broadcast
Is Field v. Evans, 262 Mass. 315, 159 N.E. 751 (1928) ; Weber v. Herman, 24
Ohio App. 395, 157 N.E. 374 (1927); Brady v. B. and B. Ice Co., 242 Ky.
138, 45 S.W. (2d) 1051 (1931).
19Plasch v. Fass, 144 Minn. 44, 174 N.W. 438, 10 A.L.R. 1446 (1919); Hubert
v. Harpe, 181 Ga. 168, 182 S.E. 167 (1935); Wells v. Lockhart, 258 Ky. 698,
81 S.W. (2d) 5 (1935); Johnson v. Schuler, 152 Minn. 137, 188 N.W. 271
(1922).
20 For other instances where because of the relationship of the parties the family
purpose doctrine has been applied, see Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 138
Ati. 365 (1927).
21 Robinson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 217 Iowa 1252, 251 N.W. 613 (1933).
22 The car owners are liable even when they are not personally negligent.23 Supra, note 2.
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a program which did not deviate from a previously submitted manu-
script. Having in mind the holdings under the automobile owner's
liability statutes, the writer cannot recognize the validity in the argu-
ment that since permission to use was granted, and since the radio
station when it grants such permission loses vital and sufficient control
over the instrument to stop a defamatory remark, it has in effect con-
sented to all that may possibly result. Such thinking seems to depend
upon too liberal a connotation of the word "consent." It seems more
logical to 'recognize that use by permission can be exceeded to such
an extent as to vitiate consent. Such is certainly the attitude of the
courts in adjudication arising out of the automobile owner's liability
statutes. Decisions have held that if an owner consents to the use or
operation of his vehicle for a definite period of time, and the use or
operation is extended past that period of time, damages cannot be
recovered. 24 Results have been the same if the automobile is used or
operated in a place different from that for which the consent is
granted. 25 Many other illustrations as to the effect of exceeding con-
sent can be drawn from the cases in which a servant while driving his
master's automobile in his master's business, deviates from the exact
scope of his employment.
In refutation of material just presented, it may be contended that
the owner of an automobile cannot place limitations upon his consent
as to the manner of operating his car. Hence an instruction concerning
speeding or careless pilotage of the vehicle would not destroy the per-
mission to use the automobile.26 Consequently, the argument may run
that by analogy a caution not to depart from a manuscript would not
vitiate consent.
It would seem, however, that protagonists of such a view would be
wrong. There appears to be a clear cut distinction between the two
situations. In the automobile cases a restriction is good which forbids
the doing of an intentional act and no good if it merely forbids the
doing of a negligent act. Applying such a rule to the radio field, it
becomes apparent that a departure from a manuscript is an intentional
rather than a negligent act. Hence such departure should vitiate the
consent given and free the broadcasting station from liability.
It seems well at this time to summarize what has been discussed.
This can be done by stating that because of the importance of con-
24Union Trust Co. v. American Commercial Car Co., 219 Mich. 557, 189 N.W.
23 (1922); di Reboylio v. Herndon, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 567, 44 P. (2d) 581(1935).2 Heavilin v. Wendell, 214 Iowa 844, 241 N.W. 654, 83 A.L.R. 872 (1932);
Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929); Rowland v. Spalti,
196 Iowa 208, 194 N.W. 90 (1923); Robinson v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 217
Iowa 1252, 251 N.W. 613 (1933).2 6 Arcora v. Morresse, 258 N.Y. 211, 214, 179 N.E. 389 (1932).
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sent, it would seem that courts should not impose liability upon broad-
casting stations on the theory that they are required to do so because
the law of defamation in some of its aspects involves liability without
fault.
II. ULTRArAZAPDOUS CONCEPT AS AN ELEMENT IN DETERMINING
LIABILITY.
Now we pass to another phase of the discussion. There is another
basis upon which it is possible to predicate the liability of a radio
station. For the suggestion has been made27 that radio broadcasting be
classed as an ultrahazardous activity of the type which would have
attached to it absolute liability for harm caused. The remaining part
of this article will concern itself with an analysis of such idea.
The task will not be easy. For in the words of Professor Harper :28
"Current statements of the law of strict liability are extraordi-
narily unsatisfactory. The paucity of scientific exposition of the
law in this field has made it so difficult to comprehend the appro-
priate scope of the principles of liability involved that courts2e 9
are frequently at a loss adequately to rationalize their judgments.
This inadequacy of exposition is so marked that as ingenious a
scholar as Salmond is forced to state the rule of absolute liability
in a somewhat generalized way, and then set forth a long list of
of 'exceptions' to the generalizations."
Because of such a situation, it is not difficult to work out a logical
argument for liability. No one, therefore, can seriously challenge much
of Professor Vold's 30 reasoning to the effect that broadcasting is an
ultrahazardous activity. It is hard to attack argument based upon gen-
eral principles capable of various applications. Specifically it is difficult
not to admit that defamation over the radio can cause great harm, that
it is impossible to entirely do away with the danger of interpolations,
and that the broadcasting company has it within its power to arrange
for self protection through indemnity insurance. The first two of the
previous contentions are unanswerable. The last argument-in many
respects the most appealing of the three-certainly should not be
controlling. It is submitted that the Pennsylvania Court in Summit
Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.3 1 is right when it criticizes such
an attitude through the following reasoning:
"This is the weakest of all the arguments (i.e., contending for
absolute liability) and begs the question. It is indeed a new
27 Again by Professor Vold in the article cited supra, note 2.28 Legal Liability Without Fault (1932) 30 MIcE. L. REv. 1001.
29 This is also true of much law review material.
30 Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts (1940) 88 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 249.
81 (Pa. 1939) 8 A. (2d) 302.
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theory that a substantive rule of law should be based upon the
possibilities of an indemnifying bond to save an innocent per-
son from loss. If an indemnifying bond is to be the basis of
judgment, then in all actions for personal injury it would be well
to establish a general rule of absolute liability, requiring the
party to be held liable without fault to take out a bond."
But even if all of the arguments are admitted to be difficult of
refutation and to convey appealing philosophy, the realism of Professor
Harper's observation3 2 is not escapable. For, as Harper clearly implies,
in the last analysis an "exception" rather than a generalization is likely
to be controlling in a decision as to whether a particular activity is
ultrahazardous.
It was, for instance, an exception to the generalizations of the
ultrahazardous activity doctrine that removed the automobile from
within the rule. For the authorities recognized that since the auto-
mobile was a thing of common usage33 it would not be wise to call
its operation an ultrahazardous activity.
Since, therefore, activities of common usage can fall without the
ultrahazardous principle, it is appropriate to reflect upon whether or
not radio broadcasting is an activity of common usage. Such investiga-
tion seems imperative before deciding whether radio stations should be
declared absolutely liable for extemporaneous defamatory utterances
of the type dealt with in this paper.
As the Restatement explains it,34 an activity is a matter of common
usage if it is customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind
or by many people in the community. Strictly interpreted, such defini-
tion sustains Professor Vold's viewpoint3 5 that radio broadcasting is
not an activity of common usage. It is submitted, however, that it is
not realistic to separate the broadcasting activity from the receiving
activity when we are discussing the matter of common usage in rela-
tion to the ultrahazardous theory. For as Sarnoff puts it in an article
in Air Law Review3 6 there is an interrelationship and interdependence
that exists between all the services of radio.3 7 It should, for example,
be clearly evident that there would be no danger from radio defama-
tion if people did not possess receiving sets. The danger exists because
of the interrelation between the broadcasting and receiving activity.
Hence, although it is necessary to talk about the liability of a radio
32 Supra, note 28.
w 3 ToRTs, RESTATEMENT (1938) § 520. See particularly comment on clause (b)
in regard to common usage.
34 Supra, note 33.
35 Supra, note 30.
36 Network Broadcasting (1939) 10 AIR L. Rv. 15.
37 The writer wishes to acknowledge the help of Mr. Lee Smith, Junior in The
Creighton University Law School, for checking legal literature as to the
point involved.
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broadcaster, when it comes to deciding the matter of common usage, it
is suggested that we must view the radio picture as a wbole. Such an
outlook will lead to the conclusion that the radio broadcaster is partici-
pating in an activity of common usage and hence should not be found
liable without fault.
As another reason for not imposing absolutely liability upon the
broadcaster, it seems valid to point out that to date there have been
very few cases of extemporaneous defamation over the radio. Such a
fact would tend to indicate that the radio station can use care which
will make it reasonably certain that there will be no departure from
the manuscript thus there does not seem to be a need for imposing
absolute liability on radio stations.38
In conclusion and by way of repetition, the writer once more wishes
to make clear that he does not feel that radio stations are entitled to
greater favors than other publishers. Under facts analogous to the
publication of defamatory matter in the newspaper (a defamatory
statement in a radio manuscript) it is felt the radio station should
be liable. On the other hand, when confronted by the factual situation
covered by this analysis, it is believed that there is no need for the
extension of the absolute liability coverage.
38 Such is the thought expressed in notes at (1939) 15 IND. LAW J. 154, and
(1940) 38 MIcE. LAW REv. 415.
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